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Upper Eagle Reg'1 Water Auth. v. Wolfe, 230 P.3d 1203 (Colo.
2010) (holding that (1) for purposes of filing a complaint, the
operational date of an augmentation plan is the date of entry of
decree, (2) the water court had the duty to prevent injury to vested
water rights, not just to remedy such injuries, and (3) the purpose of
retained jurisdiction periods is to allow courts to reconsider whether
there is injury to vested water rights.
The Upper Eagle Regional Water Authority ("Authority") is the
second-largest water system on the western slope of Colorado. The
Authority provides water for over 25,000 people, diverting over 5,000
acre-feet of water per year. Since 1995, the Authority used the same
depletion table, created by engineer Thomas Williamsen in the early
1990s, to calculate the projected depletions from out-of-priority
diversions. The Authority used this depletion table in the two
augmentation plans at issue in this case.
The Water Court for Water Division No. 5 ("water court")
approved the first augmentation plan on August 1, 2000. The
Authority used the depletion table's projections in the plan. The
Authority identified Eagle Park Reservoir as the supplemental
replacement source of water, covering out-of-priority Authority
depletions to the Eagle River up to three hundred and eighty-three
acre-feet. The water court retained jurisdiction for ten years, which
would expire August 1, 2010. The water court approved the second
augmentation plan on February 6, 2003. The Authority again used
The Authority
the depletion table's projections in this plan.
identified Homestake Reservoir as the supplemental replacement
source of water for out-of-priority Authority depletions to the Eagle
River up to one hundred and twenty-five acre-feet.. The water court
retained jurisdiction for five years, which would expire February 6,
2008.
In 2006, the State and Division Engineers ("Engineers") and the
Colorado Water Conservation Board ("CWCB") filed petitions in the
water court to invoke the retained jurisdiction provisions. The
Engineers and the CWCB alleged that the Authority's use of the
depletion tables in accounting for its out-of-priority diversions had
resulted in under-replacement of the depletions. The Engineers and
CWCB requested an injunction of the Authority's continued use of
the depletion table and an extension of the retained jurisdiction
periods until the water court conclusively established the absence of
injury to vested water rights. The Authority filed motions to dismiss
the cases, arguing that the Engineers and the CWCB could not invoke
the retained jurisdiction provisions because the augmentation plans at
issue had not yet operated. Although the water court originally
denied the motions to dismiss on June 7, 2007, it eventually
reconsidered the motions. The water court concluded that the
Engineers and the CWCB could not invoke the retained jurisdiction
period because the augmentation plans at issue had not operated.
The Engineers and CWCB subsequently appealed to the Supreme
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Court of Colorado ("court").
On consolidated appeal, the court first determined whether the
water court erred in dismissing the cases. The court held that the
water court erroneously dismissed the case because it misinterpreted
the operative date of the augmentation plans. Operation of a plan is
significant because COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-304(6) allowed the water
court to reconsider a question of injury to vested water rights under
an augmentation plan based on operational experience. In prior
cases, the court had made findings on when a plan was operational.
Relying on case law, the court determined that as a matter of law an
augmentation plan would be effective for operational purposes at-the
time of entry of the decree. It was irrelevant that the Authority had
not taken water out of either reservoir at the time the Engineers and
the CWCB filed suit. Rather, the relevant dates of operation for the
two cases were August 1, 2000, and February 6, 2003, the dates the
water court approved the authority's augmentation plans. Because
both augmentation plans were operating when the Engineers and the
CWCB filed suit, the court held that the water court should have
continued with proceedings.
The court next considered whether the Engineers and the CWCB
could invoke the water court's retained jurisdiction under an
augmentation plan to prevent injury to vested water rights. This
question was one of first impression for the court. The court looked
to the plain language of the statute as well as its purpose and intent.
The court found that under Colorado's Water Right Determination
and Administration Act of 1969 ("1969 Act") the water court could
approve augmentation plans so long as the plans did not injure vested
water rights. In addition, the 1969 Act gave the water court
discretion to include a retained jurisdiction plan. Then, the General
Assembly amended the 1969 Act in 1977 to not only require the
inclusion of a retained jurisdiction provision but also to permit the
water court to revisit its decision and extend the period of retained
jurisdiction as necessary to protect vested water rights. Accordingly,
the court found that the statute explicitly provided that the water
court could extend the retained jurisdiction period if it was unclear
whether an augmentation plan would be injurious to vested. water
rights.
Moreover, the court found that the legislative history supported
this interpretation.
The General Assembly emphasized that
nonoccurrence of an injury to a vested water right might not be
evident at first, and thus, the water courts may need to reconsider
their decisions. Because the General Assembly intended the retained
jurisdiction period to be a test period, it followed that if there was
evidence suggesting injury or the possibility of injury the water court
should be able to extend its retained jurisdiction period.
In
accordance with this finding, the court held that the water court
should make a decision on whether to extend the retained jurisdiction
in the subject cases.
Accordingly, the court, sitting en banc, reversed the water court's
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rulings in both cases and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with its opinion.
JustineShepherd
V Bar Ranch LLC v. Cotten, 233 P.3d 1200 (Colo. 2010) (holding
that the State Engineer has the power to change and revoke well
permits, and that the beneficial use of water on the date of
appropriation controls the scope of water rights).
V Bar Ranch LLC ("V Bar") drilled a well in 1946 ("Well No. 1")
that predated state law requiring wells be registered or permitted.
For two decades, V Bar used WelliNo. 1 to irrigate only the Southwest
Quarter of Section 3. In 1966, V Bar obtained the Northwest Quarter
of Section 3 and subsequently used Well No. 1 to irrigate both
quarters. In 1972, V Bar applied to the District Court for Water
Division 3 ("water court") for adjudication of Well No. 1. The water
court gave the well an appropriation date of. 1946 without assigning
an acreage or volumetric limitation. V Bar irrigated the Southwest
and Northwest Quarters of Section 3 until 1978. In 2005, the State
Engineer issued a replacement well permit that allowed V Bar to
irrigate both quarters. George Gallegos, a neighboring landowner
then petitioned the State to revoke V Bar's replacement well permit
on the grounds that the State Engineer erroneously allowed V Bar to
expand its water rights beyond the confines of the Southwest Quarter
in violation of C.R.S § 37-90-137(1).
A hearing officer found that the date of Well No. 1's
appropriation, 1946, was the operative date in determining the scope
of V Bar's water rights. The officer also found that the State Engineer
issued the replacement well permit erroneously by allowing V Bar to
expand its water use without a proper decree from a water court.
The State Engineer affirmed the decision. On V Bar's appeal, the
water court likewise affirmed, upholding application of the 1946
appropriation date and rejecting V Bar's contention that the State
Engineer lacked jurisdiction to hear and act upon Gallegos's petition
for revocation of the replacement well permit. V Bar appealed to the
Colorado Supreme Court ("court") to contest the State Engineer's
jurisdiction and object to the operative date for determination of
scope. V Bar also argued for application of the doctrine of equitable
estoppel to prevent the State Engineer from modifying the
replacement well permit.
The court first addressed the question of jurisdiction. The court
found two legislative acts useful in assessing the extent of the State
Engineer's authority: the Colorado Administrative Procedures Act
("APA"), and the Water Rights Determination and Adjudication Act
of 1969 ("1969 Act"). The APA authorizes state agencies to revoke
licenses; the court noted that a well permit is a "license" under the
APA criteria. The 1969 Act establishes the framework for the existing
water courts and extends exclusive jurisdiction to these courts in
"water matters." Though the 1969 Act does not define "water

